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Abstract
In an oligopoly conﬁguration characterized by high barriers to (re-)entry, a
ﬁnite horizon, perfect information about demand and costs and the presence of
three identical ﬁrms, we show that two of them (the predators) can choose to
charge an initial price that is so low that the third (the prey) decides to exit
immediately, after which the predators can enjoy higher proﬁts, even if they
do not raise their price. Predatory prices are thus observed on the equilibrium
path and the predators end up earning more than in the best Bertrand (or even,
collusive) equilibrium with three ﬁrms.
KEYWORDS: predation, predatory pricing, collusion, dynamic game, Bertrand
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1 Introduction
Predatory pricing has long been a (contested) fact in search of a theory. Whereas
allegations that small entrepreneurs suﬀered from the predatory practices of large ﬁrms
prominently featured in the political agitation that led to the enactment of the Sherman
Act in the US, in the 1960s and 1970s the inﬂuential Chicago critique denied that
predation could ever be a proﬁtable business strategy.1 2 There is now some evidence
that successful predation took place in a number of industries (notably, cement, match,
tobacco, telecoms and sugar) in the course of the 20th century.3
Meanwhile, predation has been put on ﬁrmer theoretical footing. Modern expla-
nations are all about asymmetric information: the predator tries to exploit the prey’s
imperfect information (or its creditors’) and manipulate its (their) belief about prof-
itability. Absent imperfect information, it is thought that predation cannot occur.4
∗I thank, without implicating, Michiel Bijlsma, Jan Boone, Eric van Damme and Wieland Müller
for very useful comments, as well as seminar audiences at the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy
Analysis (CPB) and Tilburg University.
1See e.g. Chandler (1990) for an account of the rapid industrialization process of the US economy
at the end of the 19th century and its consequences on “small” producers.
2For a forceful exposition of the Chicago critique, see Bork (1978).
3See the instances and references mentioned by Bolton, Brodley and Riordan (2000, p. 2244-2245).
4This viewpoint is well-summarized by Motta (2004, p. 415-416):
1In this note, we show that in a Bertrand oligopoly characterized by high barriers to
(re-)entry, a possibly ﬁnite horizon, perfect information about demand and costs and
the presence of three identical ﬁrms, two of them (the predators) can choose to charge
an initial price that is so low that the third (the prey) decides to exit immediately,
after which the predators can enjoy high proﬁts, even if they do not raise their prices
above pre-existing levels. Predatory prices are thus observed on the equilibrium path
and the predators end up earning higher proﬁts than in the best Bertrand equilibrium
(or, even, the best collusive equilibrium). Because costs are assumed to be convex, the
disappearance of one producer can harm productive eﬃciency. The intuition for those
results is simple: it is sometimes preferable to share a small pie between a few persons
than to share a larger pie with a lot of people! Convex costs allow ﬁrms to act on this
premise with very simple strategies and under a ﬁnite horizon, given the multiplicity of
equilibria in the one-shot game.
Note that there is no need for imperfect information (demand and cost functions
are perfectly know by all players), that a predator does not have an initial advantage
over the prey (all ﬁrms are identical), and that recoupment of the initial investment in
predatory prices does not necessarily require supra-competitive prices (ﬁrms can charge
the same price before and after a predatory episode).
In the remainder of this introduction, we review the relevant theoretical literature
on predatory pricing. The model we use is laid out in Section 2. Section 3 contains the
analysis. Section 4 discusses the relevance of the results for antitrust policy.
The leading theoretical explanations of predation are based on asymmetric infor-
mation. Kreps and Wilson (1982) proposes a resolution of Selten’s chain store paradox
that can be interpreted in predatory terms. In a ﬁnite-horizon game, a weak incum-
bent (i.e. endowed with high costs) initially builds a reputation for being strong (i.e.
low-cost, which happens with probability ε) by charging low prices. There need not
be pricing below cost but there is a sense in which the incumbent initially invests in
its reputation in order to deter future entry. Milgrom and Roberts (1982) proposes a
limit-pricing model with the same ﬂavor. Observing the price charged by a monopolist,
a potential entrant updates its belief about the type of the former (high- or low-cost)
and decides about entry. In a pooling equilibrium the high-cost incumbent charges
the low-cost monopoly price and the potential entrant chooses to stay out. Sharfstein
(1984) develops a model of "test-market predation". A potential entrant is uncertain
about the level of demand or proﬁtability in a given market. The incumbent ﬁrm
knows. In a pooling equilibrium, a high-demand incumbent charges low prices to deter
entry. Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) submit a "signal jamming" theory of predation. An
entrant is again uncertain about the level of demand. The predator openly cuts prices.
In equilibrium, the entrant knows that the price is artiﬁcially low due to incumbent’s
behavior but in the absence of information about what demand would be in normal
competitive circumstances, it prefers to exit. Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) rationalize
The manipulation of beliefs can exist only if there is some uncertainty. In a world
where all ﬁrms (...) knew perfectly what the technologies and ﬁnancial resources avail-
able to each are, their preferences and those of consumers, and their ability to behave
rationally, predation would never be observed (...).
2the "long-purse" theory of predation. In their principal-agent model, because an en-
trant’s eﬀort is not contractible, the amount of ﬁnancing it gets depends on the ﬁrm’s
internal assets. By lowering price, the predator reduces the entrant’s proﬁtability and
thus its retained earnings. Further ﬁnancing by the principal is thus jeopardized. The
prey anticipates at the beginning of the game that it will eventually have to exit.
To our knowledge, only two papers studied predation in the context of perfect
information and none delivered predatory prices on the equilibrium path under a ﬁnite
horizon. Harrington (1989) studies whether cartel members can sustain cooperation
over time under the threat of free entry in an inﬁnitely-repeated game and shows that
ﬁrms can deter entry by credibly threatening to meet any entry with an episode of below-
cost pricing. Roth (1996) shows that predatory pricing is rationalizable in an inﬁnite-
horizon, perfect-information war-of-attrition model and stresses the role of strategic
uncertainty.
2 Model
We consider a dynamic game of perfect information. The demand for a homogenous
good is given in each period by demand function D(p), which is twice continuously
diﬀerentiable, strictly decreasing (in the range where it is positive), concave and cuts
both axes. (In particular, D(a) = 0 for some a > 0.) It emanates from a representative
consumer who buys from the ﬁrm(s) oﬀering the lowest price. In case this price is
charged by several ﬁrms, sales are equally split.
There are three identical ﬁrms labelled 1, 2, and 3 present on the market. The fact
that the number of ﬁrms is ﬁxed can be attributed to the existence of barriers to entry.
For instance, potential entrants may have to pay a ﬁxed set-up cost in order to access
the market. Unless the proﬁt that an entrant can make is high enough, a potential
entrant (called ﬁrm 4 in what follows) will stay out.
In any period, ﬁrms incur a ﬁxed cost F ≥ 0 for remaining active and face a strictly
increasing marginal cost of production. So,




where MC(x)is a continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing function.5 (We denote
by AV C, AFC, and AC the average variable cost function, average ﬁxed cost function,
and average total cost function, respectively.) Firms strive to maximize the present
value of the ﬂow of proﬁts. They discount the future at a common rate δ ∈ (0,1].
The market operates over an sequence of periods t = 1,2,3...,T, where T can be
any natural number greater than 2 or, abusing notation, ∞.6 In every period, active
ﬁrms choose an action in S ≡ [0,a] ∪ {E}. E stands for "exit" while an element in
[0,a] is the price charged by a ﬁrm choosing to remain active. If, in a given period, a
5This is a simple instance of the U-shaped cost curves used to teach students in intermediate
microeconomics courses.
6We need δ < 1 if n = ∞.
3ﬁrm has chosen to exit, then it becomes inactive for the remainder of the game. That
is, exit is irreversible. We denote the set of existing ﬁrms at the beginning of period t












• π(n)(p) for the per-period, per-ﬁrm proﬁt when n ﬁrms charge the same price p;
• ˆ πi(p,N) for the highest proﬁt7 to ﬁrm i in a given period when all ﬁrms in N
charge p and the strategy set of ﬁrm i is restricted to [0,a].
We are interested in constructing certain subgame-perfect equilibria.
Abstracting from the exit decision, the results from the classical, static Bertrand
competition model with convex costs form the ﬁrst building block of our model. An
important institutional feature of Bertrand competition is that ﬁrms are committed
to serve any demand addressed to them at the posted price; they cannot turn cus-
tomers down or ration demand. As Vives (1999) indicates, apart from cases in which
continuous provision is legally mandated, this is a reasonable assumption in industries
in which customers have an on-going relationship (subscription, repeat purchases, etc)
with suppliers or the costs of restricting output in real time are high. Those probably
include water supply, electricity, or (to some extent) telecommunications. In any case,
because of this feature, under convex costs there is a continuum of Nash equilibria
including average—cost pricing and marginal-cost pricing. See the seminal paper by
Dastidar (1995) and, for the case where the monopoly proﬁt function is concave (as in
this paper), Weibull (2006). We summarize the main results in
Proposition 1 Suppose that demand is twice continuously diﬀerentiable with D￿(·) < 0
in the range in which it is positive, and the n identical ﬁrms in the market have a
strictly increasing, twice continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly convex cost function, C(·).
Let ¨ p(n) be such that π(1)(¨ p(n)) = π(n)(¨ p(n)), and ˙ p(n) such that π(n)(˙ p(n)) = −C(0).
Then, ˙ p(n) < ¨ p(n) and all ﬁrms charging a price in the interval
￿
˙ p(n), ¨ p(n)￿
is a Bertrand
equilibrium.
The intuition for those results is as follows. When costs are strictly convex, under-
cutting competitors is very costly because the unit margin decreases a lot (or even turns
negative) as output goes up, as a result of the rise in marginal cost. As a consequence,
a whole range of prices can be sustained in equilibrium, for price undercutting doesn’t
typically beneﬁt a potential deviator.
Now, in our game, because E belongs to the strategy space, the minimum payoﬀ
that a player can achieve in the one-shot game is not −C(0) but 0. (It is as if the ﬁxed
7Or, to be precise, the supremum over [0,a] of all possible proﬁts. As we work with Bertrand
competition, the best reply to a set of prices charged by other ﬁrms is not deﬁned in many cases: by
“marginally undercutting” the lowest price, it is possible to come arbitrarily close to serving the whole
market at this lowest price.
4cost were avoidable and the cost function discontinuous at 0.) The deﬁnition of ˙ p(n)
must be accordingly adjusted to π(n)(˙ p(n)) = 0. It is easy to extend Dastidar’s (1995;
lemma 7) results to show that the maximum and the minimum static Nash equilibrium
prices are still decreasing in n:
¨ p
(n) < ¨ p
(n−1),
˙ p
(n) < ˙ p
(n−1).
Although the dynamic game we consider is not a standard repeated game (because
exit is irreversible), the theory of repeated games will constitute the second building
block of our model. In particular, since the one-shot Bertrand game allows for multiple
equilibria, it is well-known from Benoît and Krishna (1985) that it is possible to give
ﬁrms incentives to depart from those equilibria over time, even under a ﬁnite number
of repetition.
3 Analysis
Obviously, there are inﬁnitely many subgame-perfect equilibria in the game that we
consider. Any sequence of prices in
￿
˙ p(3), ¨ p(3)￿
is an equilibrium path, for instance. We
are looking at a particular candidate equilibrium: in period 1 ﬁrms 1 and 2 charge a
price p1 that induces a loss to ﬁrm 3 in case it stays on the market; thereafter, they
charge a proﬁtable price p. We want ﬁrm 3 not to be able to recoup its initial loss if it
decides to stay. In contrast, we want 1 and 2 to be able to recoup their initial loss in
case 3 withdraws and they charge p thereafter. We have to specify what happens in the
case where, in period 1, ﬁrm 3 deviates by staying on the market and best-responding
to p1. In that case, ﬁrms 1 and 2 will min-max ﬁrm 3 by subsequently charging ˙ p(3)
until it (ever) exits. Thus, upon deviating, ﬁrm 3 is assured that due to the ensuing
price war, it will make zero proﬁt in the continuation equilibrium (either by staying
and charging ˙ p(3) until the end or by exiting). In case ﬁrm 1 or ﬁrm 2 deviates in the
ﬁrst period, then the equilibrium will prescribe that both of them charge ˙ p(2) in all
subsequent periods. Thus, our candidate equilibrium prescribes ﬁrms to ‘coordinate’
on zero proﬁt in all the periods that follow a deviation.
Our claim is that this equilibrium is predatory, in the sense that the predators (ﬁrm
1 and 2) ‘invest’ in low prices and accept losses in the short term only because the
exclusion of the prey (ﬁrm 3) allows them to recoup their investment in subsequent
periods.
In order to avoid proﬁtable deviations, we need:







(2) (p) ≥ 0;







The ﬁrst condition speciﬁes that the best possible deviation forﬁrm3 (best-responding
to p1 and then, say, exiting) is not proﬁtable. The second condition speciﬁes that ﬁrms
51 and 2 are willing to charge ﬁrst p1 in the ﬁrst period, then p for (T −1) periods rather
than exit immediately. The third condition speciﬁes that, conditional on staying the
game, ﬁrm 1 (and ﬁrm 2, by symmetry) is willing to post p1 in the ﬁrst period rather
than let ﬁrm 2 (ﬁrm 1) take all the losses and be subsequently min-maxed.
















Because of convex costs, for a given p, gross industry proﬁts (i.e. nπ(n)(p)+nF) are an
increasing function of n. (Once ﬁxed costs are taken into account, there is a trade-oﬀ
between the level of marginal cost and the level of ﬁxed costs, delivering an optimal
number of producers.)
For the time being, we want our candidate equilibrium to yield predators more proﬁt
than the best Bertrand equilibrium. Given the initial investment in low prices, this is
possible only if the predators make more proﬁt post exit than in the best Bertrand





which happens to be true in all circumstances.
Lemma 2 π(3)(¨ p(3)) < π(2)(¨ p(3)).



















Now, if the summation is taken on the ﬁrst fourth of the integration interval, because





































So, at ¨ p(3) the beneﬁt of sharing demand among fewer ﬁrms is always higher than
the cost associated with less eﬃcient production. In other words, by having one more
ﬁrm active in the industry, the unit margin of the ﬁrms that are already present goes up
(because of cost savings) but not suﬃciently to compensate for the decrease in volume.
For analogous reasons, ¨ p(3) is a static Nash equilibrium with two ﬁrms.
Lemma 3 ¨ p(3) ∈
￿
















































In addition, by the previous lemma, π(3)(¨ p(3)) < π(2)(¨ p(3)) and π(3)(¨ p(3)) > 0.
Thus, ¨ p(3) is a static Nash equilibrium with two ﬁrms and ˙ p(2) ≤ ¨ p(3) ≤ ¨ p(2).
Our candidate equilibrium involves ﬁrms 1 and 2 pricing so low as to force a loss
on ﬁrm 3 in case it decided to stay. So, one needs a price at or below ˙ p(3). Let’s
consider pricing right at ˙ p(3). In case ﬁrm 3 decided to stay, it would make zero proﬁt
in that period and zero proﬁt in all subsequent ones (given the candidate equilibrium
strategies). If it exited, it would make zero proﬁt (by assumption), while 1 and 2 would
make large losses (because of convex costs):
π
(2)(˙ p
(3)) < 0. (4)
7Conditional on staying in the game, each predator may or may not have the incentive
to price itself out of the market (for instance, by posting price a) and let the other one
take the losses. For the moment, we have taken care of that incentive problem by
specifying reversion to zero-proﬁt static Nash equilibrium forever upon observing a
deviation in period 1. This incentive will be obviously suﬃcient if the proﬁt to ﬁrm
1 and ﬁrm 2 is positive along the candidate equilibrium path, for by deviating a ﬁrm
would then be guaranteed zero proﬁt. In an appendix, we show that charging ˙ p(3) can
even be a short-term best response for the predators (in the sense that the revenues
covers variable costs), conditional on staying in the game.
We are now in the position to state our ﬁrst possibility result.
Proposition 4 Provided δ and T are large enough, there exists a subgame-perfect equi-
librium in which ﬁrms 1 and 2 charge ˙ p(3) in the ﬁrst period and ¨ p(3) thereafter. In this
equilibrium they make more proﬁt than in the equilibrium in which all three ﬁrms charge
¨ p(3) in all periods.
Proof. The equilibrium strategies are as follows. Firms 1 and 2 play ˙ p(3) and ﬁrm 3
plays E in period 1. Upon observing the exit of ﬁrm 3, ﬁrms 1 and 2 charge ¨ p(3) in all
subsequent periods. If exit does not occur in period 1, all ﬁrms charge ˙ p(3) until exit
is observed. If in period 1, ﬁrm 3 exits but either ﬁrm 1 or ﬁrm 2 deviates, then they
both charge ˙ p(2) in all subsequent periods.



























Therefore, for T suﬃciently large (but ﬁnite) and δ suﬃciently close to 1, ﬁrm 1 and
ﬁrm 2 not only make positive proﬁt but make more than in the best Bertrand outcome
with three ﬁrms. It is all the truer if we prescribe that the predators charge a price p
such that ¨ p(3) < p ≤ ¨ p(2) after the exit. They could even collude. Observe, however, that
by increasing their price following exit, the predators would invite ‘hit-and-run’ entry by
any ﬁrm whose entry cost is below π(1) (p). By contrast, in our candidate equilibrium,
a potential, equally eﬃcient entrant, ﬁrm 4, would face the same incentives for entry
before and after the exit of the prey. In our notation, this corresponds to the following
statement.
Remark 5 ˆ π4(¨ p(3),{1,2}) = ˆ π4(¨ p(3),{1,2,3})
Proof. ¨ p(3) is not a Bertrand equilibrium with four identical ﬁrms (for ¨ p(n) < ¨ p(n−1)
for any n). So, if ﬁrm 4 considered entry when ¨ p(3) is charged by three ﬁrms, his static










Thus, by deﬁnition of ¨ p(3):
ˆ π4(¨ p
(3),{1,2}) = ˆ π4(¨ p
(3),{1,2,3}).
So far, we have shown that providing the “shadow of the future” is important
enough, predation on the part of two ﬁrms is a natural outcome delivering more proﬁt
to those ﬁrms than the best non-collusive outcome without predation. It is also possible
to compare our predatory outcome to perfect collusion. Before proceeding, we show
that the eviction of the prey is more proﬁtable to the predators, the higher the price
charged. Let pJPn is the price that maximizes the static joint proﬁt of n ﬁrms.
Lemma 6 For any p such that ¨ p(3) ≤ p ≤ pJP1, one has π(2) (p) > π(3)(p). Moreover,
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For ¨ p(3) ≤ p ≤ pJP1, one has










































































9which is equivalent to
π






Going back to the possibility of collusion, one realizes that there are in fact two
issues at hand. The ﬁrst one is to compare the predators’ payoﬀ in the predatory pricing
equilibrium we have developed above to the best collusion payoﬀ. The predators prefer















As a matter of fact, the right-hand side is an upper bound to the best collusive proﬁt,









then it may be possible to construct an equilibrium in which, on the equilibrium path,
predators make more proﬁt by sharing the market between the two of them over suﬃ-
ciently many periods than by colluding all along. When is this inequality satisﬁed? A
simple suﬃcient condition can be worked out.






















for δ suﬃciently small.
It is easy to produce simple examples displaying the relevant feature.8 However,
if one thinks that collusion could be sustained with three ﬁrms on the basis of the
classical threat and reward possibilities allowed by repetition, then there is no reason
not to explore the option for the predators to collude after the exit of the prey. After all,
a large body of theoretical and experimental evidence supports the idea that collusion
is easier when the number of ﬁrms is smaller.9 Thus, one should allow the predators to
collude on a price between ¨ p(3) and pJP2 post exit. The next result indicates that any
collusive path followed by three ﬁrms in equilibrium can be also followed by two ﬁrms.
8For instance, take D(p) = 1 − p, C(q) = q2, F = 0, δ = 1 and T = 10.
9For an early statement of the relationship between the “critical discount rate” required for collusion
and the number of ﬁrms, see Friedman (1971). For a recent survey of the experimental evidence, see
Haan, Schoonbeek and Winkel (2009).
10Lemma 8 If the sequence (p1,p2,...,pT), such that pJP1 ≥ pt ≥ ¨ p(3) for every t ∈
{1,2,...,T}, is a subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome when three ﬁrms are active through-
out the game, then it is also a subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome when two ﬁrms are
active.
Proof. Because the sequence (p1,p2,...,pT) is a subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome
when three ﬁrms are active, it must be the case that in every period t,
π
(3)(pt) + π
(3)(pt+1) + ... + π
(3)(pT) > ˆ πi(pt,{1,2,3} \ i).
The left-hand side is the continuation equilibrium payoﬀ, while the right-hand side
stands for the sum of the best deviation proﬁt and the worst subgame-perfect punish-
ment (i.e. minmax) payoﬀ (which is zero, since a player can always exit the market
in the period following a deviation and all ﬁrms playing ˙ p(3) in all periods following a
deviation is obviously subgame-perfect).
Now, by the previous lemma, since π(3)(¨ p(3)) < π(2)(¨ p(3)), we have π(3)(pt) < π(2)(pt)
for every t. Therefore, in every period t,
π
(2)(pt) + π
(2)(pt+1) + ... + π
(2)(pT) > ˆ πi(pt,{1,2,3} \ i).
Again, the left-hand side is the continuation equilibrium payoﬀ, with two ﬁrms while the
right-hand side stands for the sum of the best deviation proﬁt and the worst subgame-
perfect punishment payoﬀ (which is again zero, since a player can always exit the market
in the period following a deviation and playing ˙ p(2) in all periods following a deviation
is obviously subgame-perfect). So, (p1,p2,...,pT) is a subgame-perfect equilibrium out-
come with two ﬁrms.
As a corollary, we have that the best equilibrium outcome for three ﬁrms can be
proﬁtably replicated with two ﬁrms only. This puts us in the position of stating our
second main result.
Proposition 9 Consider the best symmetric subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome with
three ﬁrms, (p1, ¯ p2,..., ¯ pT). Provided δ and T are large enough, then there exists a
subgame-perfect equilibrium in which ﬁrms 1 and 2 charge ˙ p(3) in the ﬁrst period, ﬁrm
3 exits and ﬁrms 1 and 2 charge (¯ p2, ¯ p3,..., ¯ pT) thereafter. In this second equilibrium,
ﬁrms 1 and 2 make more proﬁt than in the ﬁrst.
Proof. The strategies are as follows. In period 1, ﬁrms 1 and 2 charge ˙ p(3) and ﬁrm
3 chooses E. Thereafter, ﬁrms 1 and 2 play (¯ p2, ¯ p3,..., ¯ pT). If ﬁrm 3 fails to exit in
period 1, then all three ﬁrms charge ˙ p(3) until exit is observed. If either ﬁrm 1 or ﬁrm
2 fails to play in accordance with the equilibrium in any period, then they play ˙ p(2) in
all subsequent periods.
Because (p1, ¯ p2,..., ¯ pT) is a subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome with three ﬁrms,
(¯ p2, ¯ p3,..., ¯ pT) is also a subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome with three ﬁrms. By the
previous lemma, it is then also a subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome with two ﬁrms.
So, the only incentive problem is whether ﬁrms want to deviate in period 1. Firm
3 is indiﬀerent between exiting and best-responding to ˙ p(3). Firm 1 (or ﬁrm 2) makes




(2)(¯ p2) + ... + δ
T−1π
(2)(¯ pT).
11By deviating in period 1, ﬁrm 1 can avoid the loss associated with charging ˙ p(3)
and achieve zero proﬁt, but then it will also make zero proﬁt in all subsequent periods.
Thus, if the equilibrium proﬁt is positive, then there is no incentive to deviate.
Now, by a previous lemma, for any p such that ¨ p(3) ≤ p ≤ pJP1, one has
π






In the best, symmetric, subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome with three ﬁrms, pt ≥




(2)(¯ p2) + ... + δ
T−1π















then for δ and T large enough ﬁrms 1 and 2 make more proﬁt in the constructed
equilibrium than in the original one.
Thus, provided the “shadow of the future” is suﬃciently extended, two ﬁrms always
have an incentive to induce the exit of the third in order to share demand between the
two of them only. As before, this can be achieved without giving any extra incentive
to (re-)entry.
Remark 10 The second equilibrium outcome in the previous proposition is such that
ˆ π4(pt,{1,2}) ≤ ˆ π4(¯ pt,{1,2,3})
for any t ∈ {1,2,...,T}.






(3)) ≤ ˆ π4(¯ pt,{1,2,3}).
In any period t ≥ 2, we have pt ≥ ¨ p(3), so that
ˆ π4(pt,{1,2}) = ˆ π4(pt,{1,2,3}) = π
(1)(pt).
4 Discussion
Our claim is that the constructed equilibria are predatory. The prey does not actually
incur losses (this is impossible under perfect information, since the value of exiting is
set at zero) but there is a sense in which it is forced to exit not to incur them and
period 1 price is clearly predatory in the sense that it leads to losses that are borne
by the predators only in expectation of higher future proﬁts. As a matter of fact, in
the speciﬁc equilibrium we construct, the prey is indiﬀerent between staying in the
12market and sustaining the price war or exiting. The equilibrium can be made strict
by requesting the predators to charge ˙ p(3) − ε in the ﬁrst period. Similarly, predatory
pricing need not start in period 1. It is easy to construct equilibria in which all ﬁrms
make proﬁt for a while before predation starts. The model can also be extended to
include more than two predators and more than one prey.
According to the standard interpretation of the repeated-game literature, predators
can be said tacitly to collude on decreasing prices because their strategy in period 2
depends on what happened in period 1 (play ˙ p(3) if ﬁrm 3 has not exited). However,
they ﬁx prices downward and they do not necessarily collude after ﬁrm 3’s exit; instead,
they can play a static Nash equilibrium! That is: they do not necessarily prey in order
to collude but they collude so as to prey!
This result shows that joint predation can arise in equilibrium under perfect infor-
mation, so long as the prey expects a bad outcome (low price) to follow her decision
to resist the predation attempts. As usual, equilibria necessitate that ﬁrms’ beliefs be
mutually consistent, an achievement that may be diﬃcult to obtain without explicit
communication. Nevertheless, observe that joint predation is in a sense easier that
single-ﬁrm predation. In the model, a single predator could not help with charging the
monopoly price in all periods where it is the only active ﬁrm. Because it could not
commit not to raise its price in period 1, it would never induce the exit of the prey.
Even if it succeeded, following exit, it would give potential entrants incentives to ‘hit
and run’.
Notice that our theory of joint predation also generates the prediction that predation
should be easier towards “weaker” rivals. It is indeed easily seen that if the prey is
“small” or “weak” (in the sense of facing more convex costs than the predators), then
predators can achieve exit while charging a higher price in period 1.
In equilibrium, consumers beneﬁt from predatory prices: consumer surplus goes up
in period 1. From period 2 on, the price is the same as when three ﬁrms charge the
highest Bertrand (or collusive) price. In terms of total surplus, the ineﬃciency stems not
only from overconsumption in period 1 but also from the ineﬃcient production following
exclusion. (Productive eﬃciency can decrease since convex costs call for multiple ﬁrms
to share production.) This last feature is what makes predation not only anticompetitive
but also antisocial. In a model where variables costs were linear, for any nonzero level of
ﬁxed costs total surplus maximization would call for only one ﬁrm to produce, so that
a benevolent social planner (or competition authority) would in some sense be happy
to see predation take place.
Joint predation is not a theoretical curiosity. Sea shipping has historically been
cartelized and the sea shipping conferences (i.e. the cartels) have often fought entrants
with so-called ﬁghting ships that are scheduled to depart on, or close to, the day rival
ships are to depart at a rate that equals or beats the one of the entrant. (See Yamey,
1972 and Scott Morton, 1997 for historical evidence.) This practice was at the heart
of recent European case Compagnie maritime belge10. Similarly, in the US, the two
10European Court of First Instance, Cases C-395 & 396/96 Compagnie Maritime Belge Transport
NV v. Commission.
13leading cases, Matsushita11 and Brooke12 allegedly involved many predators.
Antitrust laws would likely treat any concerted attempt at evicting a rival as a
hard-core cartel practice. When this outcome is achieved by tacit coordination, the
case law is notoriously diﬃcult and, overall, favorable to the predators. In particular,
the US Supreme Court has shown extreme skepticism toward the possibility of joint
predation.13 One reason, which is valid and also applies to tacit collusion in general,
is the diﬃculty for ﬁrms to align their expectations and conducts without an explicit
agreement. Another one, which we show to be non valid, is the absence of a convincing
economic theory of joint predation.
If the abuse is treated as a predation case, of particular concern is the requirement
that the initial investment in predatory prices be recouped through so-called “supra-
competitive prices” after the exit of the prey. Proposition 4 shows that such higher
prices are not needed. In addition, the possibility for defendants to argue that their
pricing pattern has a legitimate business purpose or to invoke a meet-competitor’s-
price defense is especially problematic in the case of joint predation. By deﬁnition,
joint predators do exactly what their competitors do and we can show that charging
˙ p(3) can even qualify as a static best-response for two ﬁrms which envision staying
in the industry. (See appendix.) Therefore, it is fair to say that the existing laws
and judicial interpretations governing predatory pricing are likely to leave a number of
anticompetitive practices unchecked.
A Legitimate business response
Lemma 11 If the ﬁxed cost F is high in relation to the variable costs, then, conditional
on not exiting, charging ˙ p(3) in period 1 is a static best-response to ﬁrm 3’s exit for ﬁrms
1 and 2.
Proof. Given the candidate equilibrium strategies, conditional on staying in the game,
˙ p(3) is a static best-response for ﬁrms 1 and 2 iﬀ ˙ p(3) is at least as large as the corre-










11475 U.S. 574 (1986).
12509 U.S. 209 (1993).
13In Brooke, the Court wrote
In Matsushita, we remarked upon the general implausibility of predatory pricing.
Matsushita observed that such schemes are even more improbable when they require
coordinated action among several ﬁrms. Matsushita involved an allegation of an express
conspiracy to engage in predatory pricing. The Court noted that in addition to the
usual diﬃculties that face a single ﬁrm attemtpting to recoup predatory losses, other
problems render a conspiracy ‘incalculably more diﬃcult to execute’. In order to succeed,
the conspirators must agree on how to allocate present losses and future gains among
the ﬁrms involved, and each ﬁrm must resist powerful incentives to cheat on whatever
agreement is reached.


























































































which is positive since MC is strictly increasing. Since ˙ p(3) increases with F, if F is
suﬃciently large, then the inequality is veriﬁed.
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